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In  this  paper  recent  approaches  to  the  role  of  social  protection  systems  within 
economic development policies are discussed. Important experiences are considered, 
in  particular  those  implemented  in  medium  and  low  income  countries,  where  new 
tools  for increasing  the  effectiveness of social  and  development  policies  have  been 
tried  and  tested.  Some  lessons  are  also  examined  that  prove  useful  for  defining 
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1. Equity and growth: moving beyond a trade-off 
 
There  is  a  growing  conviction  in  economic  research  that  development  is 
multidimensional and that growth of the GDP (Gross Domestic Product) is only one 
way of looking at the economic and social development of a country.  
 
Current debate centres on people’s quality of life rather than the growth of a synthetic 
value that approximates the size of market transactions such as the GDP. Therefore, 
more importance is given to aspects which are usually neglected by economists such 
as  health,  education,  time  spent  on  work  and  care,  political  participation,  social 
relations and personal and economic security. These intangible factors are assigned an 
intrinsic value, but their importance with regard to efficiency and economic growth is 
also stressed.  
 
All this indicates that the debate on the trade-off between equity and efficiency is no 
longer  valid:  there  is  widespread  consensus  for  the  idea  that  social  and  poverty-
reducing policies also comply with reasons for growth (Ravallion, 2007, 2009).  
There is a wealth of literature that examines the links between growth, inequality and 
poverty,  but  here  I  will  briefly  mention  some  channels  that  reduce  the  conflict 
between equity and growth: 
  Vulnerable  social  groups  face  a  high  degree  of uncertainty  about  the  future, 
which  shortens  the  time  horizon  of  choices.  An  effective  social  protection 
system reduces risks and increases incentives to invest in physical and human 
capital by improving resource allocation. 
  Growth is  increased by  social  capital  where  social  capital  is  seen as  trust or 
ability to coordinate the supply of factors of a collective nature (knowledge, the 
environment, communication and social networks) (Scarlato, 2009, 2010). The 
"social capital" driver is produced by a cohesive society. However, in the new 
international  scenario,  social  balances  are  continually  destabilised  by 
redistribution of competitive advantages and the reallocation of production on a 
global scale. Uncertainty and risk prevail and cohesion needs to be built on one 
step at a time using a social protection system that ensures an acceptable level 
of equity. 
 
Another line of study shows that, on a more general level, the quality of life in an area 
is a crucial growth factor in the new integrated economic system. For example, cities 
attract external resources and incubate innovation if they offer specific local factors 
(knowledge,  human  capital,  services)  that  act  as  magnets  for  business  and  talent 
(Rullani, 2009; Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2008). Therefore, providing collective services 
and merit goods directly helps to strengthen the competitiveness of an area. 
 
2. Welfare and development in international debate 
 
If  the  various  lines  of  research  which  have  been  briefly  mentioned  are  brought 
together, a multidimensional view of development emerges based on the quality of 
life, social inclusion and access to collective services.  
 
I will briefly summarise some particularly interesting issues emerging from theory and 
practice in the international context that, in line with this approach, have interpreted 
the social protection system as a tool that accompanies development policies in the 
area.  In  emerging  and  developing  countries  in  particular,  these  systems  are 
considered an integral part of development policies. I will discuss this in more detail  
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below. 
 
It is important to bear in mind that social protection systems are meant in their widest 
sense  in  the  economic  literature  and  include  social  services,  the  supply  of  public 
goods,  such  as  education  and  health  and  active  labour  market  policies.  In  short, 
because of its broad scope, the concept of "social protection" is open to a variety of 
approaches and is still being defined (Gentilini, 2007). Furthermore, as new needs and 
new forms of poverty have emerged, the boundaries of this area of intervention have 
been  extended:  from  traditional  humanitarian  reasons,  they  have  acquired  more 
complex  implications  to  the  point  where  they  examine  how  an  integrated  social 
protection system can guarantee the rights of citizenship and the empowerment of 
citizens. 
 
The  objectives  can  be  divided  into  four  different  areas  (Devereux  and  Sabates-
Wheeler, 2004): 
  protecting  against  deprivation  (for  example,  by  introducing  safety  nets  to 
counter poverty, by providing social services);  
  preventing poverty (for example, by providing risk insurance instruments such 
as unemployment benefits, health insurance);  
  promoting  opportunities/capabilities  (for  example,  using  microcredit,  active 
employment policies);  
  transforming  the  behaviour  and  status  of  socially  vulnerable  groups  (for 
example,  with  programs  aimed  at  empowerment,  respect  for  the  rights  of 
citizenship, increasing voice and accountability). 
 
The  transition  from  purely  redistributive  action  to  measures  that  aim  to  promote 
individual  skills  and  incentives  is  a  totally  new  element  in  international  debate. 
Importance is given to the fact that social policies only have non-transitory effects if 
they act at the root of "poverty traps", i.e. if they are able to change expectations of 
economic agents, resulting in profound changes in behaviour and resource allocation 
decisions (Barrett, Carter and Ikegami, 2008).  
 
On a general level, the extension of social policy objectives leads to the identification 
of  a  welfare  system  that  can  be  defined  as  "enabling"  in  the  words  of  Stefano 
Zamagni  (Zamagni,  2009),  i.e.  a  welfare  system  that  increases  individual 
responsibility.  From  this  point  of  view,  social  policies  are  similar  to  policies  that 




If  an  effective  social  protection  system  is  to  be  implemented,  the  problem  of 
compatibility with limited financial and administrative resources must be addressed. 
One  problem  is  the  negative  opinion  of  the  effectiveness  of  aid  and  social  policies 
caused by wastefulness associated with State intervention, the risk of increasing rent-
seeking  and  the  possibility  that  welfare  policy  is  used  as  tool  designed  to  obtain 
electoral  consent.  These  obstacles  should  be  recognised  and  overcome  through 
reforms  based  on  principles  that  give  credibility  to  the  policies:  accountability, 
monitoring and enforcement of laws that protect citizens. 
 
In  order  to  apply  these  principles,  a  clear  understanding  of  the  institutional 
weaknesses  behind  failures  is  necessary.  Empirical  evidence  points  to a  number of 
problems that reoccur in the management of development policies as well as social 
policies:  fragmented  programmes,  a  multitude  of  responsible  parties,  a  lack  of  
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coordination  and  a  great  deal  of  attention  paid  to  input  and  little  to  outcome.  An 
inability of the various politicians, administrators and actors involved to learn from 
mistakes  they  have  made  and  experiences  gained  systematically  emerges.  This  is 
because  data  collection,  monitoring  and  evaluation  activities  are  expensive  and 
therefore not widespread and because project promoters are unwilling to acknowledge 
mistakes made during their mandate. These problems are interrelated. For example, 
the lack of accountability also depends on the fact that projects focus on input, a lack 
of local learning and fragmented projects. 
 
To  preserve  the  credibility  of  the  management  of  public  and  private  resources 
allocated to social expenditure as well as the validity of development aid, policies are 
needed that lead to progress which can be measured and made transparent to public 
opinion. This awareness is at the basis of international debate on development aid 
which  has  strongly  promoted  the  research  and  testing  of  new  results-based 
approaches.  The  underlying  idea  is  that  an  increase  in  the  volumes  of  aid  is  not 
enough  for  poverty  reduction  and  development:  to  achieve  these  goals  we  must 
improve aid effectiveness as well. 
 
This trend is underlined in the Paris Declaration
1, signed in 2005 by more than 100 
countries and multilateral organisations which formalises the commitment made to 
introduce  ambitious  plans  for  reform  to  improve  aid  effectiveness.  Of  the 
commitments made, two are particularly important: 
  focusing aid policies on results and outcome as measurements of performance; 
  making  donors  and  beneficiaries  mutually  accountable  in  order  to  define  a 
pyramid of effective aid. 
 
The process is making a huge impact on the management of development aid. For 
example,  the  principles  of  the  Paris  Declaration  have  been  adopted  by  the  OECD 
(Organisation  for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development)  and  the  DAC 
(Development  Assistance  Committee),  the  body  that  deals  with  development 
cooperation,  now  uses  impact  evaluation  as  a  mechanism  of  transparency  and 
accountability for aid programs (OECD-DAC, 2009).  
 
At  the  same  time,  the  Paris  Declaration  has  directed  research  towards  economic 
analysis of new solutions that increase the effectiveness of aid policies and combat 
poverty.  By  moving  in  this  direction,  development  theory  has  adopted  a  practical 
approach which aims to promote economic policy measures based on the ability to 
provide real improvement in the lives of beneficiaries. As a result, a new generation of 
instruments  is  emerging:  controlled  experiments,  ongoing  assessment  followed  by 
subsequent corrective actions, conditional transfers, cash on delivery contracts, etc. 
The characteristics that these various experiments have in common are briefly (World 
Bank, 2008): 
  social protection systems are the core of development policies; 
  State welfare is combined with private associative forms in order to alleviate 
financial constraint and increase the ability to tackle new risks; 
  the application of social policies explicitly takes a constraint into account: the 
risk of opportunism leading to a squandering of resources; 
  the choice of various instruments is based on the specific characteristics of the 
economic and social contexts in which they are used and the goals that are set; 
                                                 
1 Paris Declaration On Aid Effectiveness: Ownership, Harmonisation, Alignment, Results And Mutual 
Accountability, March 2 2005, Paris.  
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  the results-based approach and experimental research are the recommended 
methods  for  finding  out  which  measures  work  and  which  social  innovations 
should be introduced. 
 
In  particular,  solutions  that  explicitly  show  how  to  tackle  the  problems  of 
implementation  and  evaluation  of  operations,  trade-offs  linked  to  the  scarcity  of 
financial resources and administrative capability and the need to strengthen incentives 
that  maximise  the  impact  of  programmes  and  minimise  waste  are  recommended 
(Gentilini and Omamo, 2009). 
 
4. Testing the new generation of instruments 
 
There are a great deal of international experiences to learn from, many of which have 
been started in developing and middle-income countries and have begun to spread 
more recently in developed countries including the United States. 
 
The  issues  that  I  would  like  to  briefly  discuss  here  regard  the  progress  made  in 
indicators, evaluation methods and instruments. 
 
4.1. Information flows and new indicators 
 
The first point is that aid policies must also include investment in data collection and 
the development of measures of institutional capability.  The construction of impact 
indicators  (focusing  on  results  and  changes  in  people’s  well-being)  and  the  use  of 
traditional  process  indicators  (which  measure  the  inputs  and  activities  performed) 
must also be considered an integral part of policies (Davies, 2009). 
 
From  this  point  of  view,  the  work  by  DFID  (Department  for  International 
Development),  the  British  government  agency  that  deals  with  the  monitoring  of 
development  aid,  is  very  interesting.  The  DFID,  in  particular,  has  concentrated  on 
Voice & Accountability (V&A) indicators (Holland e Rhirkell, 2009). These variables are 
considered crucial in the fight against poverty. DFID therefore intends to examine to 
what  extent  the  policies  adopted  by  the  State  and  non-profit  organisations  affect 
these  factors  and  what  effect  this  has  on  development.  The  framework  used  to 
construct  V&A  indicators  is  called CAR  - Capability,  Accountability,  Responsiveness. 
Capability  refers  to  the  ability  of  governments  to  ensure  the  implementation  and 
effectiveness of policies, Accountability describes the ability of citizens and civil society 
to judge public action and Responsiveness indicates the degree of response of public, 
State  and  non-state  institutions  to  respond  to  the  needs  of  citizens  and  the 
safeguarding of citizens’ rights, including access to collective services. 
 
Studies conducted by the World Bank are equally important and identify indicators of 
governance  which  are  increasingly  linked  to  the  ability  of  governments  to  provide 
public services efficiently, improving accessibility, outcomes, and the overall quality of 
life (Ivanyna and Shah, 2010). The World Bank is also conducting a research project 
that  attempts  to  refine  subjective  indicators  such  as  indicators  of  citizens’  level  of 
satisfaction  with  basic  services  which  are  needed  to  evaluate  changes  induced  by 
policies (Dasgupta, Narayan and Skoufias, 2009).  
 
In  this  respect,  these  studies  emphasise  that  indicators  that  attempt  to  capture 
citizens’  opinions  of  public  services  such  as  health  and  education  are  subject  to 
considerable  distortion.  Satisfaction  is  influenced  by  factors  other  than  quality 
including demographic factors such as age, gender and educational level as well as  
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factors related to attitudes, past experience and expectations.  
 
Although  most  demographic  factors  can  be  observed  and  controlled,  others 
(expectations, experiences) are difficult to measure. In citizen satisfaction surveys, for 
example, expectations vary a great deal according to whether rich or poor districts are 
considered  and  this  creates  distortions  in  the  outcome  which  must  be  taken  into 
account.  The  problem  lies  with  the  fact  that  there  is  no  standard  or  universal 
benchmark  on  which  responses  are  based.  Consequently,  it  is  difficult  to  interpret 
results and make comparisons and there is no strong correlation between objective 
measures of quality and respondents’ perceptions.  
It can be concluded that indicators based on satisfaction are a useful starting point for 
a debate on policy performance and increase the accountability of those responsible, 
but  cannot  be  used  to  assess  the  real  quality  of  public  services.  However,  these 
studies also show that if statistical control for citizens’ expectations is used in analysis, 
some distortions can be corrected and the explanatory ability of collected data can be 
improved through surveys on satisfaction with basic services. 
 
4.2 Evaluation methods: experiments and pilot projects  
 
As more refined indicators are being constructed, new methods for assessing policies 
are  being  used  in  emerging  and  developing  countries  (Ravallion,  2008).  The 
theoretical  approach  is  based  on  the  belief  that  the  impact  of  aid  on  traditional 
macroeconomic  variables  (GDP,  growth)  must  not  only  be  monitored  but 
microeconomic techniques must also be used which can get "inside" the mechanisms 
of policies.  
 
More  specifically,  the  use  of  randomised  controlled  trials  to  access  the  effects  of 
specific  programmes  regarding  schools,  hospitals,  infrastructures,  etc.  is  becoming 
more  widespread  (Banerjee,  2008;  Banerjee  and  Duflo,  2008,  Banerjee  and  He, 
2008). These techniques are based on counterfactual logic: possible beneficiaries are 
randomly  assigned  to  various  groups  and  the  results  on  the  “treated”  population 
compared with a specific policy intervention and results obtained on samples of the 
population  which  do  not  undergo  “treatment”  (control  group).  The  effect  of  the 
intervention is the difference between results when it is present and when it is not.  
In  short,  experiments  and  pilot  projects  can  be  used  to  verify  step  by  step  the 
effectiveness of programs funded with public resources or external aid and measure 
the impact of interventions on the well-being of the population (Baird, McIntosh and 
Ozler, 2010). 
 
However,  this  approach  has  its  limits.  The  results  are  context-specific,  cannot 
necessarily be exported and are compatible with various economic theories. However, 
they  provide  an  extremely  useful  guide:  this  type  of  test  can  be  used  to  isolate 
individual  mechanisms,  identify  errors  and  adjust  the  course  of  actions  performed 
locally while work is in progress.  
 
4.3. Instruments that impose conditions on welfare polizie 
 
In abstract terms, equity is associated with a concept of universal and unconditional 
welfare.  However,  when  stringent  constraints  (financial,  institutional  capability)  are 
present, this theoretical concept becomes a system that is both ineffective and unfair. 
This  explains  why  programmes  that  only  allow  aid  to  be  transferred  when  specific 
conditions are met have become more widespread in developing and middle-income 
countries over the last ten years.  
  8 
 
The most widely used instruments are Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) which aim to 
improve access to education and social services for the poorest members of society 
(Skoufias,  2005;  de  Braw  and  Hoddinott,  2008;  World  Bank,  2009).  Under  the 
scheme, cash transfers are made to poor families contingent on certain behaviour: to 
receive the cash transfers, families must send their children to school and undertake 
regular health visits. The aim is therefore not only to alleviate poverty but stimulate 
investment  in human  capital  and  especially  children  so  that poverty  is  not  handed 
down from one generation to the next.  
 
In addition to schooling and health care, Conditional Cash Transfers can be linked to 
social services, job seeking, training and microcredit. The key to the success of CCTs 
lies with integration of the various health, schooling and nutrition projects based on 
the idea that the various aspects of well-being are interdependent. The other critical 
point is that this scheme reduces waste and the risks that benefits will reach people 
who do not fall within the target population (i.e. people in extreme poverty). At the 
same time, the programme minimises the interception of resources by local political 
powers through cross-checks on requested requirements and checks by various actors 
(government agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations, NGOs). 
 
Programmes of this type have been implemented in Brazil since 1993 (Bolsa famiglia 
supports 12 million households) and in Mexico since 1997 (Progresa, later renamed 
Oportunidades). Overall, the CCTS in Latin America have currently been introduced to 
15 countries and cover 22 million households, 16% of the population (Ferreira and 
Robalino, 2010). 
 
Progresa’s experience, in particular, was revolutionary because it included continuous 
monitoring and evaluation (randomised) to improve effectiveness at every step. It is 
also  interesting  to  note  that,  after  being  distributed  throughout  Latin  America,  the 
Progresa  programme  was  launched  in  developed  countries  and  not  only  other 
emerging  and  developing  countries  (Africa  and  Asia).  One  case  in  point  is  the 
application of the programme in New York with the launch of Opportunity New York 
City  (Miller,  Ricco  and  Smith,  2009). Even  in European countries, there  is  ongoing 
debate on the opportunities for reform that increase the effectiveness of programmes 
and  incentives  to  beneficiaries  so  that  they  become  an  active  part  of  policies  (de 
Neuburg,  Castonguay,  Roelen,  2007).  For  example,  in  2008,  the  United  Kingdom 
launched  a  reform  of  the  welfare  benefits  for  unemployed  people  based  on 
conditionality and evaluation of effects. 
 
The second instrument which is being tested at international level is social vouchers. 
Social vouchers can only be used to buy essential services at places authorised to do 
this (i.e. social enterprises and NGOs). Using this instrument produces effects which 
are similar to those of Conditional Cash Transfers. Social vouchers facilitate the self-
selection  of  groups  of  beneficiaries,  regulate  demand  and  encourage  desired 
behaviour. They also have greater compatibility with incentives to build assets such as 
human capital which improve the ability to earn an income. Once again, international 
experience  shows  that  social  vouchers  are  preferable  to  cash  transfers  and  the 
monopoly  of  services  provided  by  the  State  especially  in  fragile  institutional 
environments (Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler, 2004, 2006).  
 
Finally,  the  Centre  for  Global  Development  has  recently  introduced  the  Cash  on 
Delivery  Aid  (COD  Aid)  programme  which  tackles  the  problem  of  incentives  and 
accountability  in  a  different  way  (Birdsall,  Savedoff,  Vyborny,  2008;  Birdsall,  
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Savedoff, 2010). The proposal, which is based on the relationship between aid donors 
and recipient governments, is to stipulate a medium-term contract (at least 5 years) 
which  makes  payments  once  progress  made  in  mutually  shared  goals  has  been 
checked.  This  progress  must  be  assessed  using  outcome  indicators  that  have  a 
continuous  unit  of  measure  (for  example,  number  of  children  attending  school, 
reduction in drop-outs, etc.)
2 and should be made transparent to the community. On 
the other hand, input and policies are not monitored and beneficiaries are given full 
autonomy and responsibility. 
 
5. Implications for social enterprises 
 
In my opinion, the innovations I have mentioned are highly relevant to the debate 
currently taking place in Italy on the prospects offered to social enterprises as engines 
of economic development. 
 
By simplifying and schematising, a common consensus appears to have been reached 
on  the  specific  value  of  social  enterprises  in  local  development  for  a  number  of 
reasons, including their ability to overcome coordination and information asymmetry 
problems  related  to collective  resources and  direct  production  of social  cohesion in 
particular  (Borzaga,  2010).  On  a  more  general  level,  social  enterprises  can  play  a 
central role in a perspective that sees development in a multidimensional sense and 
the welfare system as an enabling system that goes beyond the idea of redistributing 
wealth  and  income.  Indeed,  social  enterprises  help  to  provide  social  security  and 
increase  the  space  of  capability  of  vulnerable  citizens  and  democratic  participation 
(Scarlato, 2008). 
 
At  the  same  time,  new  problems  emerge  such  as  those  related  to  incentives  and 
accountability, physiological problems when the resources used are largely external or 
come  from  donations  or  public  funds.  What  is  more,  there  are  often  multiple  and 
volatile  sources  of  funding.  This  further  fragments  and  weakens  the  flow  of 
information required for assessments. It is therefore difficult to allocate responsibility 
for the results achieved and guarantee transparency. Other frequent problems are: 
  information asymmetry on the quality of services offered; 
  the difficulty in defining standards and targets concerning the characteristics of 
assets such as health, education, the well-being of vulnerable groups (children, 
old people, disabled people), poverty reduction; 
  the presence of a number of often conflicting objectives. For example, when 
dealing with education/the right to study, should the number of people enrolled 
on courses be maximised or the standard of the courses?  
 
Consequently, when  implementing the supply of services typically offered by social 
enterprises,  the  party  providing  funds  has  no  way  of  checking  how  the  inputs  are 
combined to obtain a specific outcome. 
 
Obviously, accountability tools exist: ex ante assessment by municipalities and local 
authorities  and  accounting  systems  including  social  reports  and  codes  of  ethics. 
However,  as  shown  in  the  recent  Rapporto  su  Sussidiarietà  e  Pubblica 
Amministrazione  Locale  (Report  on  Subsidiarity  and  Local  Public  Administration), 
impact  assessment  in  terms  of  effectiveness  of  interventions,  response  to  citizens' 
needs, assessment of the quality of services, fallout in terms of qualitative as well as 
economic  indicators  related  to  voice,  participation,  etc.  is  still  not  very  widespread 
                                                 
2 More precisely, a fixed amount is paid for each completed progress unit.  
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(Fondazione per la Sussidiarietà, 2009).  
 
Other recent studies (and news reports) denounce the existence of social enterprises 
that  are  simply  empty  boxes,  created  in  order  to  secure  public  funds,  or  social 
enterprises which do not comply with the stated mission (see, for example, Becchetti 
and  Castriota,  2010)  and  so  do  not  use  the  combination  of  monetary  and  non-
monetary  incentives,  which  are  a  strength  of  genuine  social  enterprises.  These 
examples bring discredit to the entire social cooperation system and social enterprises 
in  general  and  should  be  strongly  opposed.  This  can  be  done  by  focusing  on  the 
constraint that opportunism poses especially where public institutions are fragile and 
behaviour based on trust is rare
3  
 
On an economic level, the problem is to create incentives that produce a mutually 
beneficial outcome. The problem faced when designing schemes that are comp atible 
with the incentives is correctly defining who bears the risk of the contract.  
Systems that provide clauses in favour of social enterprises shift the risk onto Public 
Administration  and  therefore  risk  creating  weak  incentives  for  efficiency  or 
effectiveness  in  the  organisation  of  the  social  enterprises.  Systems  that  award 
contracts by public tender with downward bidding, on the other hand, shift all the risk 
onto the social enterprise. This is an excessive burden for the social enterprise which 
prevents  a  rise  in  the  quality  of  services  offered  and  the  introduction  of  “social 
innovations” or new solutions to collective problems
4. 
In both cases, a failure to achieve results can be attributed by social enterprises to 
inadequate aid or by Public Administration to a lack of effort by the social enterprise. 
In conclusion, these schemes are not very effective in providing results.  
The problem lies with increasing responsibility on the two fronts, funding agency and 
social  enterprise,  by  increasing  accountability  to  citizens.  In  other  words,  it  is 
important  to  clarify  responsibilities,  provide  suitable  incentives  and  measure  the 
progress made using suitable indicators. With this in mind, the experiences of social 
policies  implemented  in  emerging  and  developing  countries  can  provide  some 
interesting solutions.  
 
One  innovation  includes  contractual  forms  which  only  guarantee  benefits  if  certain 
targets are met. In this way, competition is created between the social enterprises 
concerning outcomes and transparency. The basic idea behind the Cash on Delivery 
scheme  may  serve  this  purpose.  It  is  a  contract  that  can  be  applied  to  transfers 
between  foundations  and  local  governments  and  between  central  government  and 
local governments. However, it may also be used for transfers by local governments 
and foundations to social enterprises. The advantage of COD contracts is that they 
give full autonomy to resource beneficiaries and also encourage accountability and a 
search for organisational innovation in order to achieve objectives based on a shared 
agreement. 
 
Obviously, the progress made on the set targets must be assessed by a third party 
which  is  independent  of the  contracting  parties, an  organisation which  reviews  the 
                                                 
3 In Italy this risk is particularly high in Southern regions. Consider, for example, application of the Legislative 
Decree 155/2006 which governs social enterprises: Campania currently ranks first in Italy for the number of 
social enterprises registered with the Chambers of Commerce (49.36% of the total), followed by Lombardia 
(7.05%), Lazio (6.49%), Piemonte and Sardegna (6.33%) (Bronzetti et al, 2010). This data should point to the 
need to identify new incentives that correct the use of forms of enterprise in the non-profit sector for reasons 
and objectives that deviate from the typical behaviour of social enterprises.  
4 For a definition of “social innovations” and its contents, see Borzaga (2009). 
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performance  of  the  social  enterprise  using  effectiveness  as  well  as  efficiency 
indicators. Another advantage of using these procedures is the gradual collection of 
information on the results attained by the funded social enterprises.  
 
Even  social  vouchers  (which  already  exist  but  are  still  uncommon  in  Italy)  and 
Conditional Cash Transfers are managed by involving social enterprises. Note that in 
many countries with a medium or low-income, the State or international organisations 
make extensive use of Non-Governmental Organisations and other non-profit sectors 
to  provide  social  services  and  aid  to  the  population  so  that  cross-checking  can  be 
performed when innovative pilot projects are implemented. If these experiences were 
to  be  transferred  to  Italy,  the  social  enterprises  could  be  a  crucial  factor  in  the 
management  of  vouchers  and  Conditional  Cash  Transfers  which  perform  two 
additional functions as well as providing services: cross-checking and collecting data 
needed for project assessment work. 
 
The subject of assessment brings us to the question of governance or coordination of 
the various social policy actions in the area. An issue which is often examined in the 
international literature on development is that of schemes which should be adopted to 
effectively  put  together  efforts  dispersed  among  governments,  local  NGOs, 
international  bodies.  Of  the  proposed  solutions,  the  setting  up  of  an  independent, 
technical  agency  that  can  perform  a  coordinating  role  in  resource  allocation, 
information management, learning feedback and assessment is particularly interesting 
(Bold, Collier and Zeitlin, 2009). 
 
It  is  also  extremely  relevant  to the  situation  in Italy  where  there  is  no systematic 
collection of data on the results of social policies and there are no autonomous bodies 
that assess policies and the quality of services. An independent technical assessment 
agency, set up on a regional basis but adopting standards defined by the State, could 
significantly  improve  the  distribution  of  public  resources  and  stimulate  competition 
based on quality among the social enterprises. 
 
In conclusion, best practices which have been successfully used in the past must be 
carefully examined so that innovations that open up social economy perspectives can 
be  introduced.  Generally  speaking,  these  good  practices  come  from  advanced 
countries. However, international experience shows that social innovations should also 
be “imported” from emerging and developing countries. 
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